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Preface 
This report is concerned with gender relations in the informal economy of 
Kampala.  The study was commissioned by NORAD but forms part of a 
larger comparative project sponsored by the Research Council of Norway. 
 
I wish to thank Prof. Grace Bantebya Kyomuhendo at the Department of 
Women’s Studies, Makerere University, for showing interest in the project and 
for facilitating my research clearance. Of a total project time of six weeks, 
three weeks were spent in Kampala in November 2002. I am also grateful to 
A. Byaruhanga Rukooko at the Centre for Basic Research who helped me 
recruit Nora Tukahiirwa, Violet Namayanja, Olivia Nandaula, and Gloria 
Nakajumba as research assistants. Their help was invaluable as many of the 
informants only spoke Luganda. I also appreciate support from the embassy 
during my stay in Kampala, and the input provided by embassy staff during a 
seminar I gave at the end of the fieldwork. Some of the participants at the 
seminar expressed a special interest in questions concerning micro-finance and 
tax. Although neither of these two themes was central in the original research 
design, they have been given some consideration in the present report.  
 
C M I  
 1 
Introduction 
What people do for a living in urban East Africa has changed dramatically 
over the last twenty years. “Work” once meant white-collar office work or 
work in industry, and both sectors were dominated by men. In African cities 
today, informal work accounts for over 60 per cent of total employment and 
over 90 per cent of new jobs (ILO 2002:1). In Uganda, economic crisis, civil 
war and structural adjustment have ensured that women have become the 
prime providers, and the great majority of them earn their money in the 
informal economy.  
  
While incomes among the self-employed are generally lower than those in 
formal employment, many single, divorced or widowed women feed and 
educate their families alone on the basis of their entrepreneurial activity. In 
households consisting of a married couple with children, the woman brings in 
50-70 per cent of total household expenditures (Kyomuhendo 1999; Snyder 
2000). This contrasts sharply with the situation some decades ago, when 
urban men were expected to cater for their family’s needs alone.   
 
While female-headed households statistically have lower incomes than 
households headed by men, a 1999 World Bank report concludes that 
“households headed by women have higher school enrolment and completion 
rates than those headed by men” (Snyder 2000:7). This is because women tend 
to give higher priority to their children and their children’s education than do 
men. Supporting women’s entrepreneurial activities is, then, a way of securing 
families as a whole.  
 
This study looks into the opportunities for and constraints on self-employed 
women and men, such as access to capital and the tax burden. Women in 
Uganda have traditionally been disadvantaged compared to men because they 
have been excluded from owning land. They have also been limited by a 
patriarchal ideology, which dictates the kind of economic activities that are 
seen as suitable for women. Women are now in the process of entering sectors 
that were formally dominated by men, and some men are entering previously 
“female” domains such as the preparation and sale of food and hair styling. 
The report therefore examines the way in which new economic realities, 
together with the Ugandan government’s efforts to enhance gender equality, 
have changed the perceptions of what men and women can do for a living, 
and how gender relations in the informal economy as well as in households 
are affected by women’s increasing economic independence.  
1.1 What is “the informal economy”? 
The term ‘informal sector’ was first coined in the 1970s. It was introduced to 
describe “the activities of the working poor who were working very hard but 
who were not recognized, recorded, protected or regulated by the public 
authorities” (ILO 2002:1).  
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Since pre-colonial times, the informal economy of African cities has offered 
survival opportunities for poor and vulnerable migrants (Nelson 1999:4). In 
the early part of the colonial era, both wages for the employed and profit 
opportunities for the self-employed were relatively good, but with increased 
migration and economic decline things got worse and by 1940 one in three 
urban dwellers ate poorly and only one in ten were able to save (Illiffe 
1987:171).      
  
Up to the mid 1990s there was a tendency to see the informal economy as an 
urban phenomenon, and the bulk of research and policy making on this sector 
was done in cities (King and McGrath 1999:28). There is now an increasing 
concern with the informal economy of rural areas as well, and Nici Nelson 
argues that we should stop viewing the urban and the rural as separate entities 
and rather see the economy as a “complex, interrelated whole” (Nelson 
1999:5). In a recent report, the ILO argues that the term ‘informal economy’ is 
better than ‘informal sector’ for encompassing “the expanding and 
increasingly diverse group of workers and enterprises in both rural and urban 
areas operating informally” (ILO 2002:2).  
 
Informal work is characterised as being unrecognised, unprotected or 
unrecorded by the public authorities. Earlier, there was a tendency to define 
the informal economy as being untaxed economic activity. With donor 
pressure to increase revenue, however, African governments are increasingly 
taxing smaller entrepreneurs, and in Kampala, even street hawkers are now 
taxed (Muwanga 2001). Despite being registered for the purpose of tax 
collection, self-employed people like street vendors and micro-entrepreneurs, 
as well as paid domestic workers, homeworkers and workers in sweatshops 
perform their activities outside legal and regulatory frameworks. They lack a 
number of essential securities, among them employment, work and income 
security. This group is rarely organised and most of them are poorer than 
people in the formal sector, but their informal economic activities may have 
important network functions.  
 
One of our informants said that even if she did not earn that much money, she 
knew that she could trust her fellow market women to help her in times of 
economic difficulty. A study of AIDS victims in Kampala revealed that people 
who worked in markets and other public places “were more likely to be 
exposed to information about services than those who operated commercial 
activities from their rooms” (see also Obbo 1999). As pointed out by the ILO, 
the term ‘informal’ does not imply that the activities of this sector are not 
regulated: 
 
People engaged in informal activities have their own “political 
economy” – their own informal or group rules, arrangements, 
institutions and structures for mutual help and trust, providing 
loans, organizing training, transferring technology and skills, 
trading and market access, enforcing obligations, etc. What we 
do not know is what these informal rules or norms are based on 
and whether or how they observe the fundamental rights of 
workers (ILO 2002:3).  
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Jane Seruwagi Malunga, who has completed a study of women employees in 
the catering business at Owino market, found that the young, unmarried 
women hired for this work were underpaid and exploited by their middle-aged 
female employers, who needed every shilling to provide for their own families 
(Malunga 1998). 
 
A major characteristic of the informal economy is the tendency of 
entrepreneurs to invest in several sectors at the same time, or, in other words, 
to be “occupation pluralists” (Kyomuhendo 1999). Our material from 
Kampala provides three examples of this, all at different economic levels. In 
the first case, the female owner of a small tailor shop also sold second-hand 
clothes, cosmetics and cold drinks from the same room. Then, in the middle 
range, there was a woman who owned three enterprises: a wholesale shop, a 
shop for spare parts, and a catering firm. Third, a woman owning a successful 
beverage factory had just started a poultry farm raising a batch of 4,000 
chickens. The reason for this multi-sectoral engagement is partly the wish to 
be financially secure in case one enterprise fails, but also the need to provide 
dependants with income-generating employment. In this way entrepreneurs 
gain extra profit at the same time as they reduce the number of people they 
have to support economically. 
 
There have been many attempts at defining the informal sector economy. 
Most classifications have rested on the degree of informality and the size of 
employment, but informal activity is not necessarily small-scale, nor is all 
small-scale economic activity necessarily informal.  
 
Referring to work by among others Mead (Mead 1996), King has singled out 
three different types of enterprise which may all be part of the informal 
economy: formal and small, informal and small, and survivalist (see figure 1). 
Participants in the informal economy may have economic success and 
eventually grow into formal enterprises, or they may choose to stay informal. 
One incentive for the latter choice is to avoid taxation and cumbersome 
bureaucratic procedures. Several researchers have documented that enterprises 
may move along the continuum, often in a rather dramatic way, from 
subsistence to enterprise status, and the categories should therefore not be seen 
as discrete segments (Robertson 1995; King and McGrath 1999).   
 
Along the same line of thought, but specifically concerned with workers’ 
security, the ILO suggests that we should adopt “the view that formal and 
informal enterprises and workers coexist along a continuum, with decent 
work deficits most serious at the bottom end, but also existing in some formal 
jobs as well, and with increasingly decent conditions of work moving up the 
formal end” (ILO 2002:4).   
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Figure 1. Different types of enterprise within the informal economy 
 
Formal and small: Such enterprises confirm to regulations to a significant 
extent, exhibit high levels of human capital and are integrated into the 
structures of the formal economy. 
 
Informal and small: Those elements of the informal sector which are given 
descriptions such as ‘successful’ or ‘sustainable’, ‘emergent’ or 
‘entrepreneurial’. It is in these enterprises that informal sector incomes can 
outstrip those in the lower reaches of the formal sector. Though outside 
formal sector structures, often the owner-operators of such enterprises have 
had significant exposure to both formal education and training and to formal 
employment.  
 
Survivalist: Engaged primarily in commerce but also in basic and low-quality 
forms of production, those running these enterprises are typically at the level 
of subsistence, with the income earned being one of a number of resources 
that must be combined together for survival. 
 
(King and McGrath 1999:32) 
 
   
1.2 About this study 
This report looks into the informal economy of Kampala, Uganda, with a 
special focus on gender relations. It is part of a larger comparative study of the 
informal economies of Western and Eastern Africa, headed by Dr. Ragnhild 
Overå at CMI. The project will look into the historical background of the 
informal economies in the case cities (Accra, Dar es Salaam and Kampala so 
far), analyse the ways various sectors have become gendered, and discuss in 
what ways established norms for gender-appropriate economic activities are 
presently changing.   
 
In each of the case cities one hundred male and female entrepreneurs have 
been interviewed, using the same interview guide. The questions concern the 
entrepreneurs’ personal “biography” and business strategy, as well as their 
opinions about gender relations and constraints and opportunities in the 
informal economy. 
 
To facilitate comparison, the following six sectors have been selected for 
closer scrutiny in all the case cities: trade in fish, vegetables, staple foods 
(maize/rice/plantains), textiles, second-hand clothes and prepared food. In 
addition, two or more sectors that appear to be particularly interesting in the 
local setting have been added. In the case of Kampala handicrafts (curio 
shops) and hair salons were selected. Handicraft shops were selected because it 
is one of the few sectors with relatively high returns (and investment 
requirements) that are totally dominated by women. Hair salons were selected 
because they appear to be the enterprise most commonly run by women in 
addition to market stalls and catering.  
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In line with the discussions about the informal economy above, informants 
operating at different levels of scale were selected for interviews. The great 
majority fall within the category that Ugandan policy documents label micro-
enterprises. Micro-enterprises are defined as businesses employing fewer than 
5 people, with an annual turnover below 10 million shillings.  Small 
enterprises, on the other hand, are defined as employing a maximum of 50 
people, with a turnover of 10-50 million shillings (Snyder 2000:7). The sample 
includes three small enterprises: a beverage factory, a tailor shop, and a 
restaurant, which have all grown out of smaller ventures.  
 
Since women often operate their business close to their homes, a number of 
interviews were conducted outside the city centre, in the Wandegya, 
Nakivubbo, and Kabalagala suburbs. The bulk of interviews related to the fish 
sector were conducted at the fish market at Gaba landing site (by Lake 
Victoria), while handicraft shops were selected from the craft ‘villages’ at the 
National Theatre and Exposure Africa. In the Kikuubo trading area we 
interviewed wholesale dealers and traders in textiles. The majority of the 
interviews with dealers of second-hand clothes were conducted at Owino 
market. Owino market, established in 1972, is the largest market in Kampala, 
giving work to more than 20,000 people within sectors ranging from 
butcheries and vegetables to second-hand clothes and electronic goods 
(Malunga 1998:1). Interviews were conducted in Luganda, English, or 
Swahili.  
 
The coming chapter briefly looks into the history of the informal sector of 
Kampala and changing gender relations. Chapter Three is concerned with 
access to capital, including micro-finance, and the income levels of the self-
employed. Chapter Four focuses on taxation and perceptions of corruption. 
The last chapter draws the study together and briefly discusses the policy 
implications of the findings.   
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2 Changing gender relations  
“Women have now taken over. Most of the men have died, and 
of those remaining, many are unable to support their families, 
forcing the women to do so. Now the women are the ones in 
control. That’s why they dominate the business sector. If they 
had decided to stay at home our children would not have gone 
to school!” (Man, 43). 
 
“Men hate women’s economic independence. They say that we 
have grown wings” (Woman, 27).  
2.1 Historical background  
Gender inequality in Uganda is rooted in customary law relating to land 
ownership. Although women produce 70-80 per cent of the food in Uganda, 
only 7 per cent of them own land. As Christine Obbo has demonstrated, 
gender inequality was increased by colonial intervention, when men were the 
ones to receive education and paid employment. Cash crops, like coffee, were 
grown and processed by women, but sold by their husbands, who pocketed 
the income (Obbo 1980).  
 
During the economic crisis of the 1970s, peasant women started marketing 
their produce themselves and started looking for paid work. Women appear to 
have been more adaptable than men at the time. Female civil servants, for 
example, would set up a small shop to increase their income, while senior 
male civil servants saw this kind of activity as way below their social status. 
Some of the more wealthy businessmen asked their wives to look after their 
business in fear of President Idi Amin, who was suspicious of well-educated 
and rich men who would rather do business than go into politics (Snyder 
2000:19).   
 
The eviction of the Asians in the late 1970s was emphasised as an important 
opportunity for African women by some of our better off informants. Their 
shops were usually given to men, but the men often let their wives or sisters 
run them. The eviction of the Asians had very negative effects on industrial 
employment, however. In 1971, when the economic war against Asians was 
started, Asians owned around 77 per cent of the nation’s industries. After their 
eviction, many industries ceased to function. In industrial towns like Jinja, 
many people lost their source of income and were forced into self-
employment.  
 
Economic chaos and soaring inflation reduced real wages in the mid 1980s to 
one tenth of what they were in 1972. “The economic crisis”, writes Winnie 
Byanyima Karagawa, “enhanced the position of many Ugandan women, 
especially poor and peasant women, and weakened the basis for men’s 
domination” (quoted in Snyder 2000:20). The civil war, which lasted up to 
1986, left many women to cater for their families alone. In addition, women 
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who fled the country often acquired business skills and an interest in 
investment abroad. Upon their return from exile, they brought with them 
technical equipment like dry cleaning machines, popcorn machines or 
industrial sewing machines (Snyder 2000:17-19).  
 
Peace was restored in 1986 and during the following year the National 
Resistance Movement launched the first stage of structural adjustment. Grace 
Bantebya Kyomuhendo notes that the “retrenchment of public servants and 
commoditization of traditional social welfare systems have compelled many 
people to participate in the informal economy” (Kyomuhendo 1999:116). 
Structural adjustment has meant that higher education is no longer a 
guarantee of work, and retrenchment of civil servants has entailed a new 
category of poor, referred to by the World Bank as “the new poor” (Jones 
1999:9). In the course of a couple of years, the balance between informal and 
formal work was shifted in favour of informal work. Cost sharing for health 
and education, another consequence of the structural adjustment programme, 
ensured that most families needed at least two incomes to get by, and more 
and more women started up on their own.  
 
The AIDS epidemic is another important factor in women entering the 
informal economy. As one informant put it: “In most cases the men die first, 
leaving the widows to provide for the family”. National policies to enhance 
women’s rights, and increased representation of women at all levels, have also 
inspired women to work outside the home and become economically 
independent. Several of the women whom we interviewed attributed women’s 
economic independence to President Museveni:  
 
“Here our President has done a lot. In the old days women were 
backward. But when this President Museveni of ours came to 
power, he pulled us out from behind. Now even our Vice 
President is a woman. We are no longer sitting at home as in 
those days” (Woman, 27).  
 
As Aili Mari Tripp has pointed out, however, the Museveni government “has 
promoted women’s leadership to serve its own ends” (Tripp 2001:101). 
Museveni’s victory in the 1986 election is attributed to women who “cast their 
votes for peace” and Museveni has since then taken care to support women 
and the women’s movement to secure continued political support for his 
regime.  
 
The strength of the women’s movement in Uganda can be traced back to the 
1985 Nairobi World Conference and a follow-up seminar that was arranged 
outside Kampala soon afterwards. The networks formed and the 
recommendations adopted at this workshop had a profound impact on 
Uganda for years afterwards (Snyder 2000:23). Today, Uganda has one of the 
most gender sensitive constitutions on the continent, but the meagre funding is 
by no means adequate to make the many ambitious goals a reality. 
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2.2 Gendered sectors in change  
Recent figures from the Uganda National Chamber of Commerce reveal that 
women account for 70% of traders in markets and 40% in shops (New Vision 
20.07.99). Trade generally requires less capital than manufacturing and this is 
one of the reasons why there are more women in trade. Women more often 
work at home or by the roadside than men; an advantage of home-based 
enterprises is that they can be combined with childcare, and several of the 
women whom we interviewed had their children with them while at work. 
Women who can afford it, however, often send their children to boarding 
schools from a young age so that they can concentrate more on the business 
and at the same time give their children a good education. “Because they 
know that education offers unique advantages” writes Snyder, 
“businesswomen, from those working in the burning sun to the affluent, see to 
it that their children make a generational leap by getting more education than 
the parents have” (Snyder 2000:23). 
 
Although women are now slowly moving in on male arenas such as high-tech 
enterprise, taxi operation and real estate, informal economy sectors in 
Kampala are still highly gendered. According to a study by Impact Associates 
in 1995, women dominate the trading of food in markets, and are “heavily 
represented in tailoring, textiles, beverages, services and crafts” (Snyder 2000). 
Men dominate in carpentry, taxi and bodaboda (motorcycle) operation, 
wholesale shops and business related to fish. A ‘new’ sector like second-hand 
clothes, on the other hand, appears to be equally open to men and women. 
However, not only gender but also religious factors may determine the kind of 
economic activities that people judge to be appropriate for themselves or 
others. Some Muslim women are afraid to sell clothes or to do hairstyles that 
violate Muslim law (Zaamu 2002:34,58).  
 
Just as women who have capital move in on male arenas, there are signs of a 
new trend, where poor men move in on previously female arenas. As a young 
man selling matoke (plantains) along the roadside told us: “Long time ago, 
only women used to sell matoke, but now it is mostly men, because there are 
no jobs.” In sectors such as vegetables and second-hand clothing, earnings for 
men and women appear to depend more on capital and business skills than 
gender. Within prepared food, on the other hand, I found clear contrasts 
between men and women. Preparation of food is considered a female activity 
and the catering business is almost 100 per cent dominated by women. The 52 
catering stalls at Owino market, for example, are all owned and operated by 
women, who hire female assistants (Malunga 1998).  
 
The few men who are willing to venture into this female domain, however, 
may actually make a good profit. One young man had set up a small business 
producing and selling chapatis (pancakes) at a busy street corner. He operates 
from five in the afternoon to three the next morning. He said that many of his 
customers were drunk and quarrelsome and that it would have been very hard 
for a woman to do the kind of work that he does. But precisely because there 
are few other people selling snacks at this time, he is able to make Shs. 
224,000 a month, from a capital of 50,000. In comparison, a woman who 
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started out with the same capital and was selling fried fish, claimed to make 
only 36,000 a month.1   
 
The young man selling chapatis at night seems to have benefited from crossing 
the boundary between what are considered male and female activities. 
Similarly, a number of young Congolese men have found a good market in 
Ugandan and Tanzanian hair salons. While it would be unthinkable for most 
Ugandan and Tanzanian men to do women’s hair, these Congolese have 
specialised in styling. They are much in demand among female customers and 
they are paid around four times as much as female hairdressers.  
 
Not all cross-gender economic endeavours end happily, however. At the Gaba 
fish landing site, we interviewed a middle-aged man who was busy frying fish, 
a typical female task.  He said that he had started doing this for a living after 
he lost his job in the civil service. His wife, however, could not accept his new 
occupation and they ended up getting divorced.  
 
Generally, sectors that require high amounts of capital are male dominated. 
An example is wholesale shops. A male wholesale shop owner said that most 
shop owners were male because the work, which included transporting bags of 
rice and so on, is too heavy for women. It is not uncommon for husband and 
wife to operate wholesale shops together. Women who have enough capital to 
invest in a shop by themselves seem to prefer handicrafts. This sector, which is 
relatively new and profitable, is completely dominated by well-educated, 
middle class women. The trade requires not only a fair amount of capital, but 
also language skills, since most of the customers are tourists or ‘expats’. One 
of the entrepreneurs in this sector was a housewife until her husband died in 
1992. She had never worked before, but was successful and is now training 
her son in the trade. The female domination of this sector may therefore 
change in the coming years.  
 
In some sectors men dominate the capital-intensive levels while women 
dominate further down. An example is trade in textiles. At the wholesale level, 
men, often Asian, are in the majority, while retail is dominated by women. 
Many of the women selling African textiles, vitenge cloth, turned out to be 
refugees from Congo. Being illegally in the country, they preferred selling their 
merchandise directly to customers in their offices rather than on the street. 
 
The days when men sold women’s produce and pocketed the income is now 
gone. Women have become traders in their own right, but are concentrated at 
the lower level of the economic system. They work because they have to - it is 
necessary for the household budget - but several women also said that they 
appreciate the economic and personal independence that entrepreneurial 
activities entail and that they would not have stopped working even if their 
husband had been able to provide for them. 
 
                                                 
1 The exchange rate at the time of the fieldwork was Uganda Shs. 1767 to 1 US$ (November 
2002). 
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2.3 Household economics 
Married women in Kampala contribute between 50 and 70 per cent of the 
household expenses (Kyomuhendo 1999; Snyder 2000). This is a dramatic 
change from earlier times when urban men were expected to provide for their 
families. Women who are economically active have greater freedom to leave 
abusive husbands or choose not to marry at all. As one young, university 
educated woman put it: “To us, marriage is the last resort”. In 1991, 33 per 
cent of urban households were headed by women (Snyder 2000:32). Today, a 
decade later, the figure is likely to be higher.  
 
The interviews revealed great variation as to how couples arranged their 
private finances. At the one end of the spectrum, there were men whose wives 
were “housewives” and not economically active. These men would give their 
wives Shs. 2-3,000 a day for food and other expenses. At the other end of the 
spectrum were two successful female entrepreneurs who earned many times as 
much as their husbands in the civil service and who covered almost all 
household expenses. Ironically enough, these two women were among the very 
few women of the sample who knew how much their spouses earned. One 
well educated woman, when asked if she knew what her husband’s salary was, 
just laughed and said: “They normally don’t say”. She, and many others, 
shared the household expenses with their spouses without any specific 
arrangement. Others had divided the expenses between them. For example, a 
woman selling smoked fish and married to an electrician, said that she, who 
earned around Shs. 112,000 a month, covered food and health expenses while 
her husband, who earned Shs. 300,000 and tips, paid house rent and school 
fees. One young woman whose co-habitant had helped her set up a restaurant 
said that he paid for food and rent while she could use her profit for personal 
consumption and to support her two younger sisters. 
 
Several female informants mentioned the needs of their extended family as an 
important reason why they had to work. The AIDS epidemic has placed an 
extra burden on the providers who remain. Some women said that their 
husband had so many responsibilities on his side that it would be impossible 
for her to ask for support for her own relatives. Very many of those whom we 
talked to had orphaned children living with them, often outnumbering their 
biological children. The burden of school fees was a constant issue when 
household budgeting was discussed. 
2.4 Attitudes towards economically active women 
As part of the interviews respondents were asked how men have reacted to 
women’s economic independence and if it has affected the relationship 
between men and women, marriage, and so on. This question often spurred 
lively discussions and respondents were in no way unanimous. Some women 
said that the men “hated” their economic independence while others said that 
their husbands had encouraged them. A 42-year-old married woman summed 
up the situation in this way: 
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“Some men are happy with it, others not. Some men think that if 
a woman has money she will stop respecting him. Those are the 
men who don’t want their wives to work. But if he can’t 
manage, she has to work. Men have neglected their 
responsibilities and women have come in on their behalf.” 
 
Some of the ‘traditionalist’ men whom we talked to were very negative 
towards working women. They said that working women would find lovers, 
neglect their family, or spend their money in bars. Some men simply refuse to 
allow their wives to start businesses, even home-based ones. They are more 
worried about challenges to their position as “decision-makers” than the 
economic well-being of their family (see also Kyomuhendo 1999:114). 
 
Not surprisingly, the material shows a tendency for less educated men to be 
more negative towards working women than the well educated. Some men 
who had experienced a personal loss of status over recent years seemed to 
direct their aggressiveness towards women. This was the case with a former 
soldier, now making a meagre living from selling second-hand clothes at the 
Owino market. He had been retrenched from the army after 18 years of 
service because he did not have enough education and did not know English:  
 
“Relations between men and women are destroyed nowadays. 
Women no longer listen to men, and money matters bring 
problems. Even if the wife earns money, she does not help out 
with the expenses. She spends the money herself. Some of them 
even build houses!” 
 
The interviews revealed that the majority of the men appreciate women’s 
economic contributions, but few of them are willing to share household tasks. 
Women’s double workload was illustrated by the response of a 35-year-old 
married male shop owner who said (apparently without any irony at all): 
“Most men want working women, not parasites. But women ought to be at 
home in time and satisfy their husbands’ needs.”  
 
Many women complain that men “no longer care about their families” and 
that as soon as a woman starts working, the man will leave the household 
expenses to her. Muslim women in polygamous marriages seem to be 
particularly vulnerable. All the women in this category interviewed by 
Nakamatte Zaamu reported that they carried all the household expenditures 
alone (Zaamu 2002). 
 
While some men still have problems accepting that women have “grown 
wings” and become economically independent from men, the main trend in 
urban Uganda is an increasing acceptance of women’s participation in the 
informal economy. With it comes a growing awareness that what has long 
been regarded as appropriate behaviour for women and men may change and 
that crossing traditional gender barriers may be lucrative.     
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3 Start-up capital and income levels 
Limited capital is highlighted as one of the major obstacles for Ugandan small-
scale entrepreneurs, and especially so for women (Snyder 2000:306). We will 
in this chapter first look at the amount of money that self-employed men and 
women in Kampala start out with, before we discuss the various sources of 
capital. The last part of the chapter is concerned with the income levels of the 
self-employed.  
3.1 Size of start-up capital 
The majority of the men and women interviewed for this study had less than 
US$ 60 to get their business going, and 15 per cent of the women started with 
less than US$ 5. The lowest levels of capital were found amongst people who 
produced handicrafts, sold small quantities of vegetables or second-hand 
clothes, or cleaned fish. Mid-range levels of capital (US$ 50-550) were 
reported by people who traded in handicrafts, textiles, larger quantities of 
vegetables and clothes, and those who run smaller hair salons and shops. The 
most capital-intensive sectors we looked at were restaurants, tailoring, and 
larger hair salons and shops (US$ 560-5660). 
 
Figure 2. Size of start-up capital2 
 
Capital in Shs. Capital in US$ Women 
(%) 
Men 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
0-9,000  0-5 15 9  13 
10,000-99,000  5.5-56 34 27  32 
100- 990,000  56.5-560 30 27  29 
1 mill. – 4.5 mill.  566-2,547 17 13  15 
5 mill. – 10 mill.  2,830 –5,660 3 3    3 
NA  1 21 8  
Sum  100 100  100 
 
3.2 Sources of start-up capital 
The most commonly stated source of capital for both men and women was 
‘own savings’. The savings were usually made from earlier informal sector 
activity, or from wage labour. There is a clear tendency for entrepreneurs to 
change from sector to sector in search of larger profit margins and as a result 
of stiff competition “as everyone deals in similar commodities” (Kyomuhendo 
1999:117).  
 
                                                 
2 The numbers are not adjusted for inflation, but most of the enterprises were started in the 
1990s. 
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Figure 3. Source of start-up capital 
 Women (%) Men (%) Total (%) 
Own savings 28 46  34 
Natal family 24 36 28 
Spouse/lover 22 0  15 
Gift from friends 10 6    9 
Loan from friends  3 3    3 
Micro credit 7 0    4 
Inheritance 2 6    3 
Retrenchment benefits 4 0    2 
NA 0 3 1 
Sum 100 100 100 
 
A male informant selling matoke (plantain bananas) admitted that he had 
concealed some of the profits from his earlier boss until he was able to start on 
his own. Some of the women said that they had put money aside from the 
household money that they were given by their husbands.  
 
Snyder writes that it is a common misperception that women receive their 
capital from husbands. Our survey confirms her data. Only 22 per cent (15 of 
the 67 women) named their spouse, co-habitant or lover as the source of their 
capital, while 24 per cent had been supported by members of their natal 
family.3 However, all the women in our sample who were running larger 
businesses were married to or living with highly educated men who had been 
pivotal to their success – by providing initial capital, contacts and expertise.  
 
One of them, Christine Luboga, accompanied her husband when he went to 
England to study medicine in the 1980s. She herself studied tailoring, worked 
in a factory, and brought with her several industrial machines upon their 
return to Uganda. Her business has been a success and is in continuous 
expansion. She now hires 6 workers and earns many times as much as her 
husband, but this does not bother either of them. Christine says that she looks 
upon the enterprise as a “family business”. Julian N. Adyeri has a somewhat 
similar background. Married to a magistrate, she has been able to build up a 
large beverage factory without ever borrowing money. Both Christine and 
Julian are profiled members of the Uganda Small Scale Industries Association, 
and Christine has been awarded several prizes for her entrepreneurial activity. 
When I asked Julian how her husband felt about earning so much less than she 
did, she answered: “My husband is a proud man. He is proud because I am 
working, proud for what we are together”. 
 
Notably, both Christine and Julian have Christian marriages. Muslim couples 
have a somewhat different situation. Zaamu, in her study of Muslim female 
entrepreneurs in Kampala, notes that “the practice of polygamy bred mistrust 
between the two partners (and) as a result, husband and wife could not pool 
resources to a common business” (Zaamu 2002:56).  
 
                                                 
3 Parents (10), sister (4), brother (4), children (2), and other relatives (8). 
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As a rule, the money provided as start-up capital by family members is a gift, 
but the recipient is expected to share his or her profit with needy family 
members. None of the people interviewed had taken bank loans. While men 
sometimes borrow money from each other, comparatively fewer women have 
money to lend to others (Snyder 2000:306). One successful female 
entrepreneur, however, raised her capital through an interesting informal 
shareholding system. In 1994, when setting up her handicraft shop at the 
Village Craft Centre, three male friends decided to invest together Shs. 
700,000 in her business. Since the business is going well, she is now paying 
school fees of Shs. 600,000 per year for the son of one of them. To the two 
others she pays out Shs. 100,000 at Christmas time. When I commented that 
she had paid back many times as much as she initially borrowed, she 
confirmed that this was true. “Without them, I would never have been where I 
am today”, she said, and added that she would therefore continue giving them 
shares of the profit in the years to come.  
 
In recent years, this woman had converted the profits from her curio shop into 
a political career. She is a member of parliament with a special women’s seat, 
but still takes care to tend to her shop every afternoon. When I asked if the 
salary from her political position wasn’t enough, she answered that her salary 
went back to her constituency and that it was expected from her. She was in 
the process of building a secondary school in her home area, a project that will 
not only boost her political popularity, but also give her an additional income.  
3.3 Saving clubs 
The ‘traditional’ method of raising capital for small-scale female entrepreneurs 
in Africa is rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). They are 
known under a number of different names and are arranged informally, 
usually without involving banks (Ardener and Burman 1995). The main 
principle of these associations is that a group of women get together and agree 
that they will all save a given amount every day, week or month. The total 
sum is given to the members in turn. Many clubs hire a non-member 
(sometimes male) to administer the collections and allocations. During the 
years of civil war and mistrust in Uganda ROSCAs fell from favour, but when 
peace was restored they resurfaced (Snyder 2000:27-29). The associations are 
characterised by their mix of ethnicity and religion, and very few are organised 
around primary affinity (Tripp 1994).  
 
Five of the women in our sample are members of rotating saving clubs. They 
are active within different sectors (vegetables, prepared food, second-hand 
clothes, handicrafts and a shop) and are running enterprises of various sizes. 
The arrangements reflect the financial status of the members. Most women use 
their savings to buy new stock or to expand their business in other ways – but 
accumulated savings are also used for other large expenditures like school fees, 
burials and house rent (house owners tend to demand house rent for 6 months 
in advance). None of the respondents mentioned ROSCAs as the source of 
their start-up capital, but some of the women who answered “own savings” 
may well have saved their money in this form of saving club.    
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Figure 4. Examples of ROSCA arrangements 
 
Daily: A market woman dealing in vegetables saves around half of her profit, 
Shs. 1,000, every day together with a group of fellow market women.  
 
Weekly: A 27 year old woman who sells handbags and shoes in a shopping 
centre down town has joined a group of ten women who save Shs. 10,000 
every week. She uses the Shs. 100,000 that she receives after ten weeks to buy 
new stock.  
 
Monthly: A 19 year-old woman who has joined her mother’s catering business 
on the street saves Shs. 100,000 at the end of every month. Since there are 
three members in the group, she receives Shs. 300,000 every third month.  
 
 
Compared to bank saving, rotating saving and credit clubs have both 
advantages and disadvantages. On the negative side, this system does not 
provide interest and the members may risk losing their money if one or more 
of their fellow members fails to pay when it is their turn. Two of the 
informants had indeed left saving clubs after being cheated. The advantage of 
this system compared to individual saving in banks is that the women are 
“forced” to save a certain amount regularly. Without this social pressure, it 
would probably be much harder to set aside a fixed amount, since most 
women are constantly in need of cash to provide for their families.    
3.4 Micro-finance 
Acknowledging the difficulties small-scale entrepreneurs and especially women 
face accessing bank loans, both donors and the Ugandan government have set 
up micro-finance institutions. In year 2000, there were 79 registered operators 
offering micro-finance in the country, and many unregistered (Hannig and 
Katimbo-Mugwanya 2000). Micro-finance is not only a question of credit, but 
includes savings, insurance, hire-purchase and so on. Micro-credit institutions 
have in common with saving clubs the fact that members work in groups 
(usually of five) where each loan-taker is responsible for the group as a whole. 
The combination of “individual liberty within a context of community 
supervision” has proved popular among women (Pankhurst and Johnston 
1999:172). 
 
We will not here go into the details of the various arrangements of the many 
micro-finance institutions. Common to most schemes, however, is the fact that 
the loan takers have to have an already well-established business – to prove 
that they are capable of running an enterprise. Some institutions also require 
of their members that they first open an account and save a certain amount 
before they can get a loan. Usually the women go through a training 
programme before they are given their first loan. Conditions are quite tough. 
Repayment is to be started immediately, and the interest is higher than in 
banks. In 2000, the Treasury bill rates were at 7.6 per cent while the average 
lending rates of micro-finance institutions were 25 per cent (Hannig and 
Katimbo-Mugwanya 2000). When every member of the group has been able 
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to repay, the group can advance to the next levels, taking progressively larger 
loans.     
 
Ten of the 67 women whom we interviewed had made use of micro-finance.4 
The most successful of them was running a restaurant with 6 employees. Her 
start-up capital had been Shs. 3 millions, and she reported that her monthly 
profit was now around 300,000. Other loan takers had taken smaller loans 
but made comparatively better profits from it. A woman who was selling 
vitenge textiles, for example, had taken a loan of Shs. 90,000 and now made a 
profit of Shs. 70,000 every month. A vegetable seller who had taken a FINCA 
loan had a monthly profit of around Shs. 210,000, about twice as much as 
that of the other vegetable sellers of the sample who had less capital. She was 
among the top 30 per cent of the total sample when it came to income. 
Another FINCA member had taken a loan of Shs. 200,000 to run her second-
hand clothes business and earned Shs. 120,000 in a good month. She said that 
she preferred FINCA to PRIDE because the interest of the latter was too high.  
 
An interesting finding is that the majority of the people interviewed were 
negative towards micro-finance. A female fish seller said she left PRIDE for 
fear of being imprisoned, and a 19 year old woman said that “whoever joins 
them (micro-finance institutions) get problems paying back”. She added that it 
would be better if the government administered loans that didn’t have as 
tough terms. A common complaint was that micro-finance was only given to 
“rich” people, people who own property such as land and houses. This issue 
has also been hotly debated among academics:   
 
Critiques of micro-finance programmes argue that socio-
economic and political structures underpin the differentiation 
separating rich from poor. According to this view, unless 
underlying causal constraints are addressed, the financial micro-
finance tool is more likely to work within existing inequalities, 
exacerbating the risks to the poor. From ACORD’s experience, 
the danger is real and some poor urban people have suffered. 
However, the overall assessment from different internal and 
external evaluations is clearly that poor people have benefited 
significantly (Pankhurst and Johnston 1999:100).   
 
Several of the people interviewed had heard about loan takers who had lost 
their property when they failed to repay the loan. Many respondents also 
mentioned that the interest rates were too high and the grace period too short. 
While this is also a common complaint against micro-finance among scholars, 
others have argued that if NGOs involved in micro-finance refuse to charge 
real interest rates, they undermine existing financial systems (Pankhurst and 
Johnston 1999:97).  
 
Some of the more well off respondents said that they liked the idea of micro-
finance but that they did not have time to attend the meetings and training. 
Some of the women also reported having difficulties finding partners who 
                                                 
4 5 from PRIDE, 3 from FINCA/UNHCR, and 2 from FAULO. 
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could join them for micro-finance loans. Of the ten women of my sample who 
have taken micro-finance loans, two were Muslim. To many Muslim women, 
however, the Islamic teaching prohibiting interest has proved to be a very 
limiting factor in accessing credit. In her study of Muslim female entrepreneurs 
in Kampala, Nakamatte Zaamu found that they were actively discouraged by 
Imams from taking loans (Zaamu 2002:ix, 57). In Sudan, the micro-finance 
institution ACCORD solved this problem by giving loans in kind (Pankhurst 
and Johnston 1999:95). 
3.5 Income levels for the self-employed 
More than one third of the self-employed people we interviewed for this study 
claim to earn less than Shs. 100,000 a month (US$ 57). Since they are all 
family providers, this income places them in the category of “working poor” – 
people who earn “less than enough to generate a family income of US$1 per 
day per capita” (ILO 2002). Their income is considerably lower than that of 
civil servants at the bottom scale, who earn around Shs. 300,000 – 400,000 a 
month, but about equal to semi-formal positions such as operators of public 
telephones and toilets (Ssenkaaba 2002). Some of the interviewees may have 
under-reported their income in the hope of attracting economic support, or 
because they feared a tax increase (see also Malunga 1998). However, the 
uniform character of the responses indicates that this is not the case.  
 
Since few of the respondents had any idea of what they made in a month, we 
would ask them to tell us their profit on a “bad day” and a “good day”. The 
majority answered that they had a profit between Shs. 1,000 and Shs. 4,000 a 
day. In many sectors (especially hair salons) weekends are the better days, and 
65 per cent of the respondents said that they worked every day, while 33 per 
cent worked six days a week. Working days were also longer than in the 
public sector, often around 12 hours. Another disadvantage, compared to 
formal employment, is the lack of social security. Grace Bantebya 
Kyomuhendo has demonstrated that female entrepreneurs often sacrifice their 
own health for the well-being of their family. Rather than going to hospital 
when they fall sick, they choose to be treated at home so that they can 
continue monitoring their business. Women also tend to prioritise buying 
inputs for their business rather than medicine for themselves. When their 
children fall sick, women face even tougher dilemmas. In one case, a woman 
had to accompany her child to hospital for a week. Meanwhile, her business, 
which the whole family depended upon, collapsed (Kyomuhendo 1999:122).   
 
As figure 5 reveals, most sectors offer both low and high profit opportunities, 
according to the money invested and the business skills of the individual. 
Moreover, there was no clear relationship between the money invested and the 
profit made. One female fish seller, for example, had started with a capital of 
Shs. 50,000 in 1998 and had a monthly profit of around Shs. 48,000. Another 
woman, who had specialised in buying and reselling smoked fish from the 
islands in Lake Victoria, had started out with about the same capital (Shs. 
40,000 in 1993), but had a monthly profit which was twice that of her 
colleague (Shs. 112,000). The explanatory factor in this case may be the 
number of years each of them has been in the business, and the level of 
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education. The woman with the lower profit has primary education only, 
while the more successful entrepreneur is a senior 4 graduate. She started her 
business after she was made redundant at the office where she was working.     
Figure 5. Monthly profit by sector 
 
Monthly profit in 
Shillings 
 
Shs. 40,000 – 
199,000 
 
 
Shs. 200,000 –  
1 million 
 
Shs. 1 million 
1.5 million 
 
Monthly profit in 
US$ 
  
US$ 22-112 
 
 
 US$ 113-566 
  
US$ 567-849 
 M F M F M F 
Fish 5 2 1    
Vegetables 1 8 1 1   
Prepared food 1 6 1 5   
Textiles 1 3  4   
Second-hand clothes  3 1 2   
Rice & maize 3 1 3 2 1  
Hair salons 2 3 2 3   
Handicrafts  4  2   
Tailoring  3    1 
Miscellaneous 2 5 1 3 1 1 
Sum by sex 15  38 10 22 2 2 
 
Per cent by sex 
 
 
56% 
 
62% 
 
37% 
 
35% 
 
7% 
 
3% 
Sum 53  32  4  
 
Per cent in total 
 
 
60% 
 
36% 
 
4% 
 
Self-employed people may earn both more and less than day labourers who 
work for others. Shop assistants (male and female) and women who are hired 
to cook for others, for example, earn Shs. 2,000 a day or around Shs. 54,000 
a month. Bar girls are paid Shs. 1,500 a day or Shs. 40,500 a month. It is not 
uncommon for the “boss” to buy lunch for his or her employees, and some 
also give money for transport on top of the salary. There are cases where day 
labourers earn more money than the people who hire them. Kajokaya reports 
that one of the men who helps women smoke fish at Gaba landing site makes 
Shs. 30,000 a day, adding up to Shs. 840,000 a month (Kajokaya 2002).  
 
The data collected in Kampala confirms the major propositions about the 
informal economy discussed in chapter one. Self-employed people generally 
earn less than people in the formal sector, they work longer days and longer 
weeks, they lack basic security, and they feel inhibited by lack of capital to 
expand their business or move into a different and more lucrative sector. 
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4 Revenue and perceptions of corruption 
As discussed in the introduction, the informal economy in Africa remained 
largely untaxed for many years. In recent years, the government of Uganda 
and the Kampala city authorities have put greater effort into tax collection, in 
the form of licences, market dues, graduated tax and income tax. In the period 
1990 to 2001, Kampala City Council (KCC) increased their revenue from a 
little more than Shs. 4 million per year to Shs. 21 billion (The Monitor, 8 Sept. 
2001).  For self-employed people who pay tax, almost a third of profits goes 
to income taxes (Snyder 2000:309). We will briefly consider the different 
forms of tax before we move on to peoples’ perceptions of taxation and 
corruption within the revenue authorities. 
4.1 Licences 
Self-employed people within most sectors are required to have a licence from 
Kampala City Council, which must be renewed yearly. Almost half of the 
people interviewed for this study had obtained a licence for 2002. The price of 
the licence is meant to reflect the size of the business and the profit made. 
Fishmongers and people who sell vegetables at the market, for example, pay 
from Shs. 5,000 to 20,000. Owners of smaller tailor shops and hair salons pay 
around Shs. 30,000, while larger establishments like restaurants and more up-
scale salons pay double. The most expensive licences in our sample were 
obtained by owners of wholesale shops (Shs. 100,000 – 250,000) and the 
owner of a beverage factory (Shs. 500,000). 
   
In addition to revenue collection, the licences have a control function. People 
serving food have their premises inspected by a health officer, and in larger 
markets the authorities use the issuing of licences to restrict the number of 
people competing within one sector. At Gaba landing site, for example, only 
fishmongers who have obtained a licence are allowed to buy fish at the 
auction (Kajokaya 2002:59).   
4.2 Administration of markets  
The administration of all the major markets in Kampala is in the process of 
being privatised. Earlier, the daily administration of the larger markets was 
performed by so-called “Market Masters” and “Resistance Council Officials”, 
who worked directly under the Kampala City Council (Malunga 1998:5). The 
market masters were responsible for allocating stalls and for collecting the 
monthly rental fee for Kampala City Council (Shs. 3,450 or US$ 3.45 in 
1994).  In addition, vendors paid a daily security fee to the market security 
guards (Shs. 200 or 20 cents), as well as a fee to the Resistance Council offices 
for waste disposal and renovation of the market (Shs. 600 or 60 cents). 
However, people working at the market complained that this money was 
never used for its proper purpose since it was the vendors themselves who 
cleaned the market and renovated the stalls:  
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All the employers complained bitterly about the Resistance 
Council Officials, the market management committee and the 
Kampala City Council officials who collected money from the 
market vendors without putting it to proper use (Malunga 
1998:23). 
 
Today, interested parties are invited through newspaper advertisements to bid 
for tenders for market administration. Successful bidders become responsible 
for the collection of taxes on behalf of KCC and for keeping the markets 
clean. The new system has caused some controversy. First, the market dues are 
set by KCC, but they are not always stated in the contracts. There is therefore 
reason to fear that the companies will overtax the vendors (The Monitor, 
15.11.2002). Secondly, some companies have started collecting taxes from 
businessmen and women even before they have won the tender (Muwanga 
2001, Ntabadde 2002). There are also cases where bidders have been accused 
of bribing personnel within KCC to secure the contract (The Monitor, 20 
Sept. 2001).  
 
The largest market in Kampala, Owino Market, with more than 5,000 stalls, 
was “sold” to a private company for Shs. 1.6 billions in 2002. The vendors at 
the market were never consulted. They now fear that the company will 
attempt to charge rent for the stalls and shops at the market, constructions 
that have been set up by the vendors at their own expense (The Monitor, 
15.11.02).  
 
In the case of the Gaba landing site, the situation is quite different. Here, a 
group of 8 successful boat owners and fishermen (all male) took over the 
administration of the market in 2000.5 The leader of the group is a 34-year-
old senior 5 graduate who started fishing at the weekends to help his parents 
pay school fees. He found fishing lucrative and bought his own boat and nets, 
which he now hires out. Since the new market administration has grown out 
of the market community itself, the relationship between them and the 
vendors is likely to be better than at Owino market, where the new market 
management is an outside company.   
4.3 Graduated tax and income tax 
Graduated tax in Uganda is a “head tax” to be paid annually by all able-
bodied men. Women and the old are exempted, a relic from the time when 
only men were expected to have cash income.6 In urban areas, economically 
active women are supposed to pay the tax as well, but in our sample the 
majority of the 40 per cent of the respondents who had paid this tax (ranging 
from Shs. 18 000 to 30 000) were men. That the ‘gendered’ targeting of this 
tax is unfair is illustrated by the following cases.  
 
An 18-year-old woman who had invested Shs. 2 millions in a small 
‘supermarket’ had paid a licence of Shs. 75,000 but had never been asked to 
                                                 
5 The name of the company is “Gaba Market Property Owners Uganda LTD”. 
6 It is not uncommon for women to pay their husband’s tax. They fear that if they don’t, their 
husbands will sell off land to meet the cost of Shs. 18 000 (The New Vision, 15.05.01). 
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pay graduated tax. A 20-year-old man selling matoke (plantains) along the 
roadside, on the other hand, did not have a licence, but at the beginning of the 
year he had paid Shs. 13,000 in graduated tax. Unfortunately, he lost the 
receipt, and had to pay a Shs. 8,000 fine to have a new receipt issued. 
Compared to his capital of Shs. 50,000, the tax burden from graduated tax 
was heavy. 
 
Only seven of the respondents had paid income tax and all of them belonged 
to the upper crust of the sample. They were running shops and restaurants and 
paid from Shs. 100,000 to 200,000 in income tax annually (in addition to 
licence and graduated tax). They reported that the tax collectors would pass 
by their establishments and simply estimate the tax due. Considering their 
profits, and compared to people at the lower levels, their tax burden does not 
seem unreasonable.  
4.4 Problems with the present revenue system 
Despite recent efforts to increase tax collection, half of the self-employed 
people whom we talked to do not pay any taxes at all. People who move 
about with their merchandise, such as  women who sell vitenge textiles or 
second-hand clothes directly to people at their offices, can easily evade the tax 
collectors. But the low percentage of taxpayers in our sample is not only the 
result of people actively hiding from tax collectors. Even among respondents 
who operated stalls in public places there were many who did not pay tax. 
Tax collectors, despite their bad reputation for ruthlessness, do seem to take 
people’s economic situation into consideration, leaving alone people who are 
visibly poor and living from hand to mouth. 
 
In some cases non-taxpayers earn so little that tax enforcement would put 
them out of business, but there are also cases where people earn considerable 
amounts without contributing to the common good. One example is a young 
man whose parents had helped him invest Shs. 1.5 million in a computer, to 
record CDs for music stores. Since his business was home-based, he did not 
pay any taxes. Some respondents said that they did not have to get a licence 
because their business was still small, but that they would have to pay for one 
if it grew bigger. This consideration keeps them from expanding, since they 
fear that their actual profit will be lower if they do.  
 
Similarly, entrepreneurs may choose to move around with their merchandise 
rather than operate from a stall or shop. One of our respondents earned 
around Shs. 250,000 a month from selling vitenge clothes directly to 
customers working in offices. She did not pay any taxes. One of her 
colleagues, on the other hand, who had rented space in a shop with eight other 
vendors, paid a licence fee of Shs. 18,000 and Shs. 17,000 in graduated tax. 
As pointed out in a recent ILO publication, informal enterprises often “create 
unfair competition for formal enterprises by not paying taxes or social security 
contributions for workers or avoiding other business costs incurred in the 
formal economy” (ILO 2002:4).   
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One of the main problems with the present system is that since few business 
people keep books, tax collectors estimate the profits of the entrepreneurs on 
the basis of what they see as the potential income of the business. There is a 
tendency for them to judge the profit of a given business from the money 
invested in it, rather than from the actual output. There is no “grace period” 
for new establishments. A comparison between four different entrepreneurs 
may illustrate this problem.  
 
Two young women, 18 and 26 years old, had recently invested Shs. 2 millions 
each in a small ‘supermarket’ and a hair salon respectively. Since they were 
new in the market, they did not yet have many customers, and they both 
complained bitterly about being overtaxed. The hair salon owner, for 
example, claimed to have a gross income of only Shs. 150,000 a month. She 
paid Shs. 65,000 a month in tax, adding up to Shs. 780,000 a year. 
 
This is in stark contrast to a 54-year-old woman who had run a successful 
tailoring shop since 1987. In 2001 her turnover was Shs. 100 million, and she 
had paid altogether Shs. 270,000 in tax. 7  She concluded that for her, the tax 
authorities were no problem at all. Similarly, a 45-year-old man, who had 
invested Shs. 5 million in a hardware shop in 1994 and now had a monthly 
profit of Shs. 500,000, said that he did not really think the tax authorities 
asked him for a lot of money. There is little doubt that the two of them 
suffered less than the two young women mentioned above, who had just 
started out and were struggling to get their businesses going. 
4.5 Corruption within tax the administration 
In 2001 KCC was ranked the third most corrupt institution in Uganda by the 
Inspector General of Government, after the police and the judiciary (The 
Monitor, 23.10.2001, and 24.10.2001). The Town Clerk defended KCC staff 
by referring to their low salaries, which he claimed lasted for one week only 
(The Monitor, 08.09.2001). The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) also has a 
bad reputation when it comes to corruption, but is currently going through a 
restructuring to combat the problem.8 
 
While corruption in the URA mainly concerns importers and large-scale 
businessmen/women there are also examples of smaller entrepreneurs who 
have contacts with officers in charge of tax collection and who are therefore 
able to evade  taxes (Malunga 1998:53). As a result, competition may become 
unfair and people may have very different profits from the same kind of 
business. 
 
Less than one fifth of the people interviewed trusted the tax authorities. “They 
are cheats”, “They cheat us but we can’t do anything”, “They are 300% 
corrupt!” were typical responses when we asked respondents if they had faith 
in the revenue authorities.  
 
                                                 
7 Shs. 50 000 to KCC for licence, 100 000 to the URA and Shs. 30 000 in graduated tax. She 
also paid graduated tax for her six employees,  Shs. 15 000 for each.  
8 Interview with the Commissioner General of the URA,  Annebritt Aslund, 29.11.02.  
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Figure 6. Trust in tax authorities 
 Yes Mixed No NA 
Do you have faith in the tax 
authorities? 
18% 12% 54% 16% 
Does tax money come back to 
the people in the form of social 
services? 
19% 12% 58% 11% 
 
A male wholesale dealer in textiles differentiated between the various tax 
institutions: “The ones who collect income tax are trustworthy but not the 
ones who collect graduated tax”. There was a tendency for better off people to 
be more positive than the more disadvantaged.  While the poor referred to tax 
collectors and the URA as “those big people”, two teachers who had started 
up a wholesale shop argued that “the URA people are corrupt because their 
salaries are too low”. A 45-year-old woman, who was selling vitenge textiles 
from a shop, complained: 
 
“The revenue people come here, but they don’t have fixed prices. 
They ask you if you have paid the revenue, but even when you 
show them the receipts, they continue to bother you. They want 
bribes. They can even take you somewhere and you lose your 
customers.”  
 
Respondents were also asked if they believed tax money came back to the 
people in the form of social services. Again, the great majority were negative. 
They complained that they had to pay for medicine at the hospitals and that 
school fees were too high. The most common complaint was about corruption 
among tax collectors. A young male vegetable seller, for example, said: “It 
never comes back. They just use it to satisfy themselves”. Some of the 
informants argued that the tax money was used to fight “endless wars” rather 
than to provide services. A well educated woman who was running a curio 
shop, had this to say:  
 
“If they used it for free schools and medicine in the hospitals 
then we wouldn’t have minded. But there are a lot of thieves. 
The country gets into debts that our grandchildren will be 
unable to pay.”  
 
Together with difficulties in accessing capital, a heavy tax burden is what 
urban entrepreneurs most often mention as a major obstacle (Snyder 
2000:309). Corrupt tax officials, a low level of social services, and the 
corresponding low level of tax compliance has become a vicious circle in 
Uganda, as in many other African countries. Since the privatisation of the 
market administration in Kampala is still recent, it is too early to tell whether 
the new system will increase revenue to the state and city authorities, and to 
what degree privatisation will represent an improvement when it comes to 
cleaning and waste collection.  
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5 Ways forward 
The government of Uganda has been hailed for its achievements in improving 
the national economy. However, despite the fact that there is a direct link 
between the productivity of the small-scale economy and the economy as a 
whole, the men and women who struggle to make ends meet in the informal 
economy do not feel that they are part of a national strategy or that the 
authorities do anything to help them (King and McGrath 1999). On the 
contrary, the tax authorities and a cumbersome bureaucracy are mentioned as 
being among the major obstacles that they face. African governments, donors 
and the ILO agree that in order to be genuinely capable of contributing to 
lasting growth in Africa, the small-scale economy must be formalised: 
 
For a country as a whole, informality stifles the more efficient 
use of resources and improvements in productivity. As a result, 
the economy functions below its potential, with negative impacts 
on rates of economic growth (ILO 2002:7).  
 
Formalisation will increase state income from revenue, but also requires 
governments to “invest heavily in the structures of good governance to ensure 
enforcement of contracts, protect property rights, guarantee personal safety 
and social stability, reduce environmental and public health risks and so on” 
(ILO 2002:7). From the viewpoint of the self-employed, however, there are 
several incentives to remain informal, among them the wish to escape taxation 
and time-consuming bureaucratic procedures. As Snyder has pointed out, 
entrepreneurs in Kampala “have had to contend with 120 bylaws and their 
amendments” (Snyder 2000:309). One must therefore take care to ensure that 
formalisation by the interventions suggested above does not entail even more 
cumbersome bureaucracy. The tax system also needs to be reformed to reduce 
corrupting practices and tax evasion. Our case studies have demonstrated that 
the tax system is highly unfair – high income earners sometimes pay less tax 
than people with meagre incomes. Graduated tax, targeted towards men on 
the basis of their sex rather than on income, is a case in point.   
 
If tax collection were to be enforced more generally, the incentive to stay 
informal, or to stay small rather than to expand, would be decreased. 
Increased tax enforcement would have to be accompanied by strict measures 
to control the collected money and transparency when it comes to government 
and city council expenditure. Tax compliance would most probably improve if 
people saw concrete results from their contributions. The majority of the 
people interviewed for this study doubted that tax money resulted in improved 
services.  
 
Free education and free or subsidised health services would not only improve 
tax compliance, but also ease the economic burden of poor women 
considerably. School fees were mentioned by many informants as being the 
greatest economic burden for their household (and in real numbers higher 
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than the money they spend on tax). Several women participated in rotating 
saving clubs to be able to meet this expense. Although UPE (Universal Primary 
Education) was introduced in 1997, a universal claim by informants was that 
one still has to pay for government primary schooling in Kampala. Those who 
could afford it paid extra for private schools, hoping to give their children a 
better future. An improved public school system would decrease the 
mushrooming of private, expensive, and often low-quality schools, and reduce 
the economic burden on women.  
 
Margareth Snyder’s research in Kampala has shown that women invest their 
earnings in “child and family requirements” while men tend to spend more on 
personal consumption (Snyder 2000:10). Her findings are confirmed by a 
World Bank study which found that children of female-headed households 
had higher school enrolment and completion rates than children who grew up 
in male-headed households. This information is a major argument in favour of 
targeting support and loans specifically to female entrepreneurs. 
Unfortunately, exactly the opposite is taking place. Of World Bank loans 
managed by the Bank of Uganda, only one per cent went to women in 1995. A 
study of the World Bank funded programmes intended to provide credit for 
the private sector proved that they had not benefited the operations of small 
and medium enterprises, despite the fact that these are the kind of enterprises 
that “produce four fifths of the country’s manufactured goods, contribute 20 
per cent of GDP and provide the principal source of employment” (Snyder 
2000:307).     
 
As the sub-chapter on micro-finance in this report reveals, many female 
businesswomen in Kampala are sceptical about micro-credit institutions, and 
findings from other African countries do indeed reveal that some loan takers 
suffer badly. Still, a number of our respondents had improved their business 
on the basis of micro-finance loans, some of them substantially. A study of the 
services offered by FINCA, FOCCAS and PRIDE in Uganda concludes that 
these programmes reach their target groups and that positive changes are more 
likely to occur with participation in the programmes than without (Barnes, 
Gaile et al. 2001).  
 
A recent large-scale evaluation of the effects of micro-finance in several 
countries found a positive impact on poverty reduction, but cast doubt on the 
ability of the programmes to reach the poorest of the poor (Morduch and 
Haley 2002). The authors argue against the thesis that only people with an 
existing entrepreneurial activity can benefit from micro-finance and proposes 
that micro-finance can be effective also for the poorest. This is contrary to 
earlier proposals, which held that it may be more efficient in the long run “to 
target those who have the greatest potential to employ others” rather than the 
poorest of the poor (King and McGrath 1999). The challenge, then, is to find 
a proper balance between the three objectives of micro-finance programmes: 
financial sustainability, institutional ownership, and social targeting 
(Pankhurst and Johnston 1999), and to adapt the programmes to different 
categories of loan taker. Whereas poorer borrowers may need flexible 
arrangements with bite-size loans, better-off households should receive larger 
loans (Cohen and Sebstad 2000). 
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At the present time, the demand for micro-finance products and services in 
Kampala is higher than formal banking institutions, non-bank micro-finance 
institutions and government ministries can meet (Snyder 2000:306). Support 
to female entrepreneurs through micro-finance institutions, if properly 
adapted to local needs, may help not only the loan takers, but also poorer 
women who are hired by them. To facilitate formalisation and avoid 
exploitation of hired labour in the informal economy, micro-finance 
institutions should preferably include in their training and contracts with loan 
takers the rights of workers, including minimum pay.  
 
Snyder’s research has shown that women’s enterprises survive longer than 
those of men (Snyder 2000:306). One reason may be that they operate smaller 
enterprises and that they take fewer risks. Since there is often a positive 
correlation between risk and profit, however, more women should be given 
the chance to take risks – without fear of ending up on the street.  
 
Women’s economic independence in Uganda was born out of crisis – they 
started entrepreneurial activities when their men were at war, had died, lost 
their job, or simply didn’t earn enough money to provide for their family. 
While the process has been positive for gender equality, there is little doubt 
that many women and their children suffer from the long working days and 
the often hazardous work environment of the informal economy.  
 
When efforts are made towards formalisation, be it through national 
regulations, local government institutions or urban planning, it is of central 
importance to invite actors within the informal economy to take part in the 
process. A group that constitutes more than 60 per cent of the workforce 
cannot, and should not, be ignored in the social and economic development 
plans of African countries.  
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Appendix 1. Schedule of fieldwork in Kampala November 
2002 
 
Date Place/Institution Activity/People met 
Tuesday  
12 11 02 
Royal Norwegian Embassy Olive Bwanika,  
Assistant Programme Officer 
 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Nina Richner 
 Royal Norwegian Embassy Ambassador Tore Gjøs and 
Torill Iversen, NORAD  
 Makerere University Interviews with four prospective 
research assistants selected by Dr. 
Rukooko. 
Wednesday  
13 11 02 
Uganda Small Scale 
Industries Association 
Interview with Vincent Ssennyondo,  
Executive Director 
 Department of Women and 
Gender Studies, Makerere 
University  
Prof. Grace Bantebya,  
Head of Department 
 
 Uganda National Council for 
Science and Technology  
Application for Research Clearance  
 Nakivubbo Mews Interviews with entrepreneurs  
(2, of which 1 by assistant) 
 Nakivubbo Park Yard Interviews with entrepreneurs  
(8, of which 5 by assistant) 
Thursday  
14 11 02 
Makerere Instructing assistants 
 Gaba Landing Site  Interviews with entrepreneurs  
(10, of which 5 by assistant) 
 Kabalagala Market  Interviews with entrepreneurs  
(2, of which 1 by assistant) 
 Kabalagala commercial area Interviews with entrepreneurs  
(3, of which 2 by assistant) 
Friday  
15 11 02 
Nakulabye Interviews with entrepreneurs  
(10, of which 6 by assistant) 
Saturday  
16 11 02 
Makerere Revision of interview guide 
 Uganda Arts and Crafts 
Association, National 
Theatre 
Interviews with entrepreneurs (3) 
Monday  
18 11 02 
Kikuubo Interviews with entrepreneurs  
(8, of which 3 by assistant). 
Tuesday 
19 11 02 
DFID Tim Williams, 
Advisor on Governance 
 Uganda National Council for 
Science and Technology 
Finalising of Research Clearance 
 Exposure Africa Marketing 
and Information Centre 
Interviews with entrepreneurs (3) 
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Wednesday 
20 11 02 
DANIDA Request for interview with Thomas 
Djurhuus 
 Delight Uganda Ltd, 
Kawempe 
Request for interview with Julian N. 
Adyeri 
 Karere, Kalarwe, Wandegya Interviews with entrepreneurs (4) 
 FINCA Uganda (Foundation 
for International Community 
Assistance, micro-finance) 
Interview with Magala Lule Robert, 
Marketing Officer 
Thursday 
21 11 02 
Chris-Sams Designs Ltd.  Interview with Christine Luboga 
 DFID Decentralisation Donor Sub-Goup 
Meeting 
Friday 
22 11 02 
Makerere Organising field data 
 DANIDA Interview with Thomas Djurhuus, 
Sous Chef 
Saturday 
23 11 02 
Makerere Finalising work with Gloria 
Nakajumba and Olivia Nandaula 
(research assistants) 
Monday 
24 11 02 
Makerere Making appointments for further 
interviews. Organising field data. 
Finalising work with Norah 
Tukahiiwa (research assistant). 
Tuesday 
25 11 02 
Uganda Debt Network Augustine M. Muserero, Programme 
Officer 
 DANIDA Meeting on DANIDA’s anti-
corruption programme 
 Centre for Basic Research Research in newspaper archives 
 Kawempe Interview with Julian N. Adyeri, 
owner of beverage factory 
Wednesday 
26 11 02 
Makerere Organising field data, preparations 
for presentation  
Thursday 
27 11 02 
Royal Norwegian Embassy Presentation of findings 
 City Centre Interview with Technical Advisor 
Darryn Jenkins, Uganda Revenue 
Authority 
 Centre for Basic Research Collection of photocopies from 
newspaper archive 
Friday  
28 11 02 
Makerere Interview with Commissioner General 
Annebritt Aslund, Uganda Revenue 
Authority 
 Library, Department of 
Women and Gender Studies, 
Makerere  
Study of relevant BA and MA theses  
 Entebbe Departure for Norway 
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Summary 
In urban Africa, informal employment constitutes 90 per cent 
of all new jobs. Informal work is characterised by being 
unrecognised, unprotected or unrecorded by the public 
authorities, and a larger percentage of women than men earn 
their living in the informal economy.  
This study looks into the gender relations of the 
informal economy of Kampala.  A combination of internal war 
and unrest, economic crisis, the AIDS epidemic, economic 
restructuring, and government policies enhancing women, have 
changed gender relations in Uganda over the last decades. 
Urban men were once expected to provide for their families, 
but today married women bring in 50-70 per cent of household 
incomes.  
While some men feel threatened by women’s 
economic independence, others realise that female 
entrepreneurship is needed in the present economic realities. 
Many women complain that since they started working, the 
men have stopped contributing to household expenses.    
The bulk of women are engaged in sectors 
traditionally defined as female, but some venture into male 
arenas where profits are generally higher. Similarly, men with 
limited capital have started going into ‘female’ domains (such 
as catering and hair styling), changing the landscape of the 
urban informal economy. 
Informants interviewed for this study cited lack of 
capital as a major obstacle. Almost one in two started their 
enterprise with less than US$ 55, and more than one third claim 
to make less than US$ 57 a month. Some female respondents 
had benefited from micro finance loans, but the majority were 
deeply sceptical of micro finance institutions.    
While increased formalisation would enhance both the 
national economy as a whole and enhance worker’s security, an 
unfair and random tax system functions as an incentive for the 
self-employed to stay informal and avoid expansion.    
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